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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In response to Daniel Straub's challenge to the district court's award of wrongful
death damages as restitution in his criminal case, the State makes two primary
responses. First, the State asserts that Mr. Straub's claims on appeal are not properly
justiciable by this Court because this challenge was waived by his underlying guilty
plea. Second, the State claims that the district court's award of restitution was proper.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, given a proper reading of the waiver
contained within Mr. Straub's guilty plea agreement, the district court's unlawful award
of restitution was not encompassed within the prospective waiver in this agreement.
Additionally, this Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the State's argument
on appeal, the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to the right to a jury
determination under Article I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution is in no way resolved
by whether a statute would purport to permit the issue to be heard the district court
alone.

While Mr. Straub continues to vigorously dispute the State's claim that the

district court's award of wrongful death damages is authorized by statute, this
contention is irrelevant in any event, as the Idaho State Constitutional guarantee of a
right to jury trial would trump any statutory provision that would purport to remove or
diminish this right.
Finally, the State asserts that the wrongful death damages award under the guise
of restitution in this case is authorized by I.C. § 19-5304. While Mr. Straub continues to
vigorously assert that the State's claim is without legal merit, he will rely on the
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arguments previously contained within his Appellant's Brief, and will not reiterate those
same arguments herein.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Straub's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it entered a restitution award against
Mr. Straub in the amount of $554,506.67?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Entered A Criminal Restitution Order
Against Mr. Straub In The Amount Of $554,506.67

A.

Mr. Straub's Challenge On Appeal To The District Court's Award Of Restitution In
This Case Was Not Waived Under The Terms Of His Plea Agreement, And Is
Therefore Properly Justiciable By This Court
The State has asserted on appeal that Mr. Straub's challenges to the restitution

order in his case are not reviewable on appeal, claiming that they have been waived in
light of Mr. Straub's underlying plea agreement. However, a review of the totality of this
plea agreement, along with pertinent standards governing the interpretation of waivers
of rights within plea agreements, reveals this argument to be without merit.
Plea agreements, being contractual in nature, are generally interpreted by this
Court in accordance with contract law principles. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 143 Idaho
267, 270 (Ct. App. 2006). This includes review for whether the terms of the contract are
ambiguous. When the language in a plea agreement is ambiguous, this Court will hold
any ambiguity against the State and in favor of the defendant. State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 593, 595 (2010). As held by the Peterson Court:
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. "As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are
occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear
responsibility for any lack of clarity.'" "[A]mbiguities are construed in favor
of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding
also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant
to plead guilty."

Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). "When interpreting a
term of a contract, this Court is obligated to view the entire agreement as a whole to
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discern the parties' intentions." Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, 148
Idaho 638, 640 (2010).
In this case, the State bases its argument that Mr. Straub waived his right to
appeal from an unlawful restitution order by the district court on the following language
from Mr. Straub's guilty plea:
By accepting this offer the Defendant waived the right to appeal any
issues regarding the conviction, including all matters involving the plea or
sentencing and any rulings made by the court, including all suppression
issues.
(R., p.110; Respondent's Brief, pp.7-12.)
Nothing in this waiver indicated whether it would cover prospective rulings by
the district court on matters other than sentencing. (R., p.110.) As was noted by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Mosqueda, restitution proceedings are not part of a
defendant's sentence, but are rather separate civil proceedings, and therefore any
waiver of rights specific to Mr. Straub's sentence would not encompass his right to
appeal from the district court's restitution order in his case. See State v. Mosqueda,
150 Idaho 830, 833-834 (Ct. App. 2010).

Therefore, because the Idaho Court of

Appeals has determined that the district court's restitution order is part of, "a civil
proceeding distinct from a criminal case," as was held in Mosqueda, any waiver of rights
as to Mr. Straub's criminal offense or sentencing cannot be imputed to the district
court's subsequent restitution order. Id.
In addition, a review of the entire record of the plea agreement in this case
reveals that the parties specifically contemplated and bargained for only lawful
restitution - i.e. that authorized by statute, and therefore this specific agreement as to
restitution would be controlling over any other general term.
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Specific or special

provisions control over more general ones where both may be read to relate to the
same subject matter. See, e.g., Barr Development Inc. v. Utah Mortg. Loan Corp., 106
Idaho 46, 48 (1983); Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 518-519
(1948).
The issue of restitution was a term of the plea agreement that was specifically
bargained for by the parties, and it was expressly limited to only that restitution that was
authorized by statute. (R., p.110.) Because the parties specifically bargained for only
that restitution which is authorized by statute, any restitution order that exceeded this
bargained-for term was not within the parties' contemplation at the time of entering the
plea agreement. As such, this order should not be held to be encompassed within
Mr. Straub's waiver of appellate rights, as any such order could not have been part of a
knowing or voluntary waiver on Mr. Straub's part. This is in accord with the holdings of
numerous other jurisdictions that have declined to enforce a waiver of appellate rights
with regard to prospective rulings that are outside the expectations or contemplated
events of the parties.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2000)

(applying narrow interpretation of waiver of appellate rights, and construing waiver
against the State in finding that defendant's appeal was properly justiciable); U.S.

V.

Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that a waiver of the right to

appeal would not prevent an appeal where the sentence imposed is not in accordance
with the negotiated agreement); Williams

V.

State, 37 S.W.3d 137, 139-140 (Tex. Ct.

App.2001).
For this same reason, Mr. Straub's purported waiver - at least, under the State's
interpretation, could not have been knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and

6

therefore any waiver of the right to challenge the unlawful restitution order is without
legal effect.

"Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the

accused knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and
that he intentionally chose to forego them." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
237 (1973). While a party may prospectively waive rights on appeal, such a waiver
must be, "an intentional relinquishment of a known right," - which has been held to
require that the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See McCarthy v. U.S.,
394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Any waiver contained within a plea agreement that cannot
meet this standard violates due process and will be held void.

Id.

By the terms of

Mr. Straub's plea agreement, the district court was limited to only award restitution that
was actually authorized by statute. Mr. Straub never intentionally relinquished his rights
to only be subject to lawful restitution - in fact, he expressly reserved them. As such,
the finding of a waiver of his right to challenge an unlawful restitution order - which is
the interpretation of the plea agreement urged by the State - would not comport with
due process, and therefore would be void.
The Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Murphy, largely relied upon by the
State in this appeal, actually supports this conclusion. See State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho
456, 456-457 (1994) (see also Respondent's Brief, pp.7-B.) The Murphy Court notes
that waivers of the right to appeal can be valid in Idaho - but only if these waivers can
be demonstrated to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. Central to the finding of a
voluntary waiver of the appellate rights in Murphy was the fact that there was no
question or ambiguity regarding the scope of the defendant's waiver of appellate rights,
and that the defendant, "knew full well the consequences of waiving his right to appeal
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the judgment and sentence."

Id. at 457.

Given this, the record affirmatively

demonstrated a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal the
specific issues later presented to the appellate court.
Here, in contrast, the record indicates that Mr. Straub could only have reasonably
anticipated an award of restitution within statutory limits. He could not have been said
to know "full well" that the district court would award over one-half million dollars in
wrongful death damages under the guise of criminal restitution.
And, despite the State's assertions otherwise, this case falls within the ambit of
the holding in State v. Holdaway, which dealt with an appellate waiver that did not
specifically waive post-judgment rulings. See State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 484
(Ct. App. 1997).

In Holdaway, the defendant waived his right to appeal from his

judgment of conviction and sentence. Id. at 483-484. However, the language in the
waiver of appellate rights did not expressly subsume post-judgment rulings by the
district court. Id. Because post-judgment rulings were not expressly contained within
the waiver of appellate rights in Holdaway, the court rejected the State's suggestion that
the issues on appeal were not properly justiciable. Id. This Court should do the same.
Contrary to the State's assertion, there is no unambiguous waiver of Mr. Straub's
right to challenge on appeal the district court's restitution award in this case. At the very
least, the failure of the waiver of appellate rights in Mr. Straub's case to make any
mention of prospective rulings that he could not be expected to anticipate (i.e. an
unlawful restitution award) coupled with the parties' apparent mutual expectation that
only lawful restitution would be awarded, renders the waiver in this case, at the very
least, ambiguous as to Mr. Straub's appellate rights regarding the district court's
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ultimate restitution order.

As previously noted, any ambiguity with regard to plea

agreements are strictly construed against the State and in the defendant's favor.
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595-596. Under such an interpretation, and further in light of the

pertinent standards for waivers contained within a guilty plea, the appellate waiver in
Mr. Straub's case does not preclude his current challenge on appeal to the district
court's unlawful restitution order.

B.

The District Court Violated Mr. Straub's Right To A Jury Trial Under Article 1, § 7
Of The Idaho State Constitution When The District Court Tried The Issue Of
Whether Ms. Webster Was Entitled To Wrongful Death Damages Without First
Obtaining A Valid Waiver Of Mr. Straub's Right To A Jury Determination On This
Issue
In response to Mr. Straub's claim that he had a constitutional right, under Article

I, § 7 of the Idaho State Constitution, to a jury determination as to any award of wrongful
death damages, the State makes only one narrow response. The State argues that,
because (in the State's view) wrongful death damages are subsumed in the restitution
statute which does not provide for a jury determination, there can be no right to a jury
trial under the Idaho State Constitution. This claim is without merit.
As an initial matter, one key concession made by the State is critical to this issue.
The State concedes that the damages awarded as restitution by the district court in this
case, "are recoverable in a civil wrongful death action." (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) And
the State never disputes the fact that actions to recover this type of damages carried
with it the guarantee of the right to a jury trial at the time of the adoption of the Idaho
State Constitution.

(Respondent's Brief, p.16.)

These two facts, taken together,

demonstrate Mr. Straub had a right under the Idaho State Constitution to a jury
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determination as to any purported award of wrongful death damages - regardless of the
label attached to such an award.
It is of no accord whether the restitution statute would purport to eliminate the
right to a jury determination.

In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has deemed those

portions of a statute that purported to eliminate the right to a jury trial to be
unconstitutional and a nullity where the Idaho State Constitution provides for the right to
a jury trial for such actions. See Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Free, 126 Idaho
422, 424-427 (1994).

Because this is the State's sole contention on appeal, and

because this assertion is irrelevant to the issue of whether Mr. Straub had a
constitutional right to a jury determination regarding the award of any wrongful death
damages, the State's claim that Mr. Straub was not entitled to a jury determination is
with out merit.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Straub respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying Mr. Straub's motion for reconsideration of the restitution order in this case,
vacate the restitution order, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2011.
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